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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Felony-Misdemeanor Distinction In The Maryland
Law Of Arrest
Robinson v. State'
During a routine patrol on the afternoon of July 4, 1965, an officer
of the Prince George's County Police Department discovered a severed
lock on a fence surrounding a storehouse. He entered the grounds and
observed that a door to the storehouse had been broken. Inside the
building he saw four men who fled when they saw him. Two of the
men ran out the door and escaped over the fence. The officer returned
to his patrol car and radioed a "lookout" for the four men, describing
the clothes of the two who had jumped the fence. Officer Donahue of
the Bladensburg Police heard a broadcast of the lookout about ten
minutes later. He saw the defendant and another man walking along
the railroad tracks about three quarters of a mile from the storehouse.
He testified: "I observed the defendant and then I saw that he was
running, his pants were all raggedy and torn up and he matched the
1. 4 Md. App. 515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968).
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description that the lookout was put out for."' The men came out onto
the road "hitch-hiking." A car stopped to pick them up, but Officer
Donahue arrived and ordered the two men out of the car at gun point.
The men were returned to the storehouse and searched; an automobile
registration card was seized which led the officers to a white Cadillac
car parked nearby. The car was photographed, and a search of the car
disclosed a pair of bolt cutters which were also seized. The defendant
was charged with storehouse breaking with an intent to steal goods of
the value of $100.00 or more, grand larceny and receiving stolen goods.
At the trial, photographs of the Cadillac were introduced; the car was
identified as that in which the bolt cutters were found. The bolt cutters
were marked for identification and displayed on a table in the court-
room, but were never offered in evidence. The evidence was received
in the presence of the jury. The defendant objected to testimony con-
cerning the Cadillac and to the reception of the photographs into evi-
dence. He moved for a mistrial upon the display of the bolt cutters.
These objections and motions were all denied. At the close of all the
evidence the trial court reconsidered and granted a motion to quash
all evidence as to the bolt cutters, the car and the pictures of it, and the
$205 that Officer Donahue had seized from the defendant, on the ground
that such evidence was seized as the result of an illegal arrest. Never-
theless, the jury convicted the defendant on the grand larceny and
storehouse breaking counts.8
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed defendant's
conviction for grand larceny on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence, but upheld the lower court's judgment with respect to store-
house breaking. The court first addressed itself to the defendant's
argument that the trial court had violated Maryland Rule 729 by
hearing defendant's objection to the admissibility of the state's evi-
dence in the presence of the jury.' Although the rule was not yet in
effect at the time of defendant's trial, the court found that the substance
of the rule was preferred Maryland procedure even before its adoption.5
The court concluded that the trial court had committed error by per-
mitting the jury to hear its consideration of the admissibility of the
challenged evidence, but found that the error was not sufficiently prej-
udicial to require reversal.
2. Id. at 518-19, 243 A.2d at 882.
3. The trial court granted a motion for acquittal as to the charge of receiving
stolen goods. The Court of Special Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the charge of grand larceny and reversed the conviction. The court might
have avoided making its decision by upholding Robinson's arrest on the ground that
the officer receiving the lookout had probable cause to believe a felony, grand larceny,
had been committed. See Lamot v. State, 2 Md. App. 378, 384 n.1, 234 A.2d 615,
619 n.1 (1967).
4. MD. R.P. 729d(2): "... If the case is being tried before a jury the
hearing on the motion, or on an objection to the introduction of evidence alleged to
have been obtained by an unlawful search or seizure, shall be out of the presence of
the jury." The obvious purpose of the rule is to prevent prejudice to a defendant by
a display of evidence, which is later ruled inadmissible, before the jury.
5. Rule 729 has been in effect only since September 1, 1967, but its substance
was firmly entrenched in prior case law. See, e.g., Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526,
197 A.2d 434 (1964).
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The crucial factor in the appellate court's determination that the
violation of Rule 729 was not prejudicial was its finding that the
defendant's arrest, and, thus, the accompanying search, were lawful.
A search accompanying and incident to a lawful arrest has been upheld
as not "unreasonable" within the prohibition of the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution,6 and, therefore, evidence seized
during such a search is properly admissible at trial. Thus the legality
of the search and consequent admissibility of the seized evidence is
tested and determined in such a case by the legality of the arrest.
The law governing arrests derives from ancient common law. In
some states the law of arrest is now entirely regulated by statute,
7
although many of these statutes merely codify the common law. In
Maryland the common law rules are in force, except for some minor
statutory provisions.' At common law, the lawfulness of an arrest
depends largely on whether the crime for which a person is arrested
is a felony or a misdemeanor. The distinction between these two
degrees of crime has become extremely hazy; indeed, the only valid
general proposition is that a felony is usually considered a more serious
crime than a misdemeanor. This vagueness stems, basically, from the
evolution of the old English common law. At common law, a felony
conviction resulted in total forfeiture of either lands or goods. The
"felony" classification, with its accompanying forfeiture remedy, was
reserved for the most serious crimes.9 In this country the penalty of
forfeiture as punishment for a crime is unknown, but the distinctive
terms have continued. In some states "felony" is used to describe an
offense that carries a penitentiary sentence. 0 However, most crimes
now carry with them the possibility of penitentiary terms. In the
federal jurisdictions any crime which can carry a sentence of more
than one year's imprisonment is a felony." In Maryland, the "felony"
label is applied only to crimes "which were such at common law, or
6. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Article 26 of the Declara-
tion of Rights of the Maryland Constitution forbids searches without warrants, but
has been held not to preclude warrantless searches incidental to valid arrests. See
Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80 (1960); Callahan v. State, 163 Md. 298,
162 A. 856 (1932). An arrest may not, however, be used merely as a pretext to search
for evidence. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Musgrove v.
State, 1 Md. App. 540, 232 A.2d 272 (1967).
7. Illinois and California have recently enacted comprehensive statutes. CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 834-51 (West 1956 & Supp. 1968). ILL ANN. STAT ch. 38, § 107
(Smith-Hurd 1964).
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 65, § 51 (1968) (exemption for member of organized
militia from civil arrest while on duty); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 620 (1967)
(exempting persons coming into the state in obedience to a summons to testify in a
Maryland court and persons passing through the state in obedience to a summons to
testify in another state).
9. The common law felonies were murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, burglary,
larceny (distinction between grand and petit larceny being a later statutory creation),
arson, sodomy and mayhem. L. HOCHHEIMER, CRIMINAL LAW § 4, at 22-23 (2d
ed. 1904).
10. See, e.g., Lashley v. State, 236 Ala. 1, 180 So. 717 (1938).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). This definition may result in the same crime being
both a felony and a misdemeanor. For example, under the National Prohibition Act
of 1919, ch. 85, tit. II, § 29, 41 Stat. 305, transportation of illicit liquor was a mis-
demeanor the first or second time it was committed, but a felony when the third
offense occurred because the violator could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154-56 (1925).
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have been so declared by statute." 2 As a result, many serious crimes
of more recent origin are only misdemeanors.
The arbitrary and imprecise nature of the felony-misdemeanor
distinction would be only a matter of curiosity if it were not such a
critical factor in the law of arrest. The rule in Maryland has long
been that any police officer has a right to arrest, without first obtaining
a warrant, any person committing any crime in the officer's presence
or view." When the crime is not committed in the officer's presence
or view, he can arrest the person without first obtaining a warrant
only if he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed,
and that the person he is arresting is the felon. Existence of probable
cause, thus, will protect the police officer from a charge of false arrest
even if no crime has been committed. 4 "Probable cause exists 'where
the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that'
an offense has been or is being committed."' 5 While probable cause
must be judged in each case on its particular facts, it is clear that it is
a broader concept than "in the presence or view of the officer," the
standard for misdemeanor arrests.' 6 The broader scope of the power
to arrest for a felony is justified on the ground that public safety and
the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses require
that such arrests should be made at once, without a warrant. Flight
12. Bowser v. State, 136 Md. 342, 345, 110 A. 854, 855 (1920) ; Dutton v. State,
123 Md. 373, 378, 91 A. 417, 420 (1914).
13. See Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. Iv. 125, 155(1941). This article contains a comprehensive discussion of the subject of arrest in
Maryland, and is still the leading authority on the subject. Its broad scope covers
arrests with warrants, arrests by private persons and forcible entry of buildings, areas
not treated in this Note. So far as the authority of the police officer is concerned,
Maryland follows the common law: 1) A police officer may arrest without a warrant
a person who commits a felony in his presence or view, id.; 2) a police officer may
arrest without a warrant when a felony has in fact been committed, whether or not
in his presence or view, when he has reasonable ground to believe the arrestee
has committed it, e.g., Brish v. Carter, 98 Md. 445, 57 A. 210 (1904) ; but see note
14 infra; 3) a peace officer may arrest without a warrant for any misdemeanor com-
mitted in his presence or view, Robinson v. State, 200 Md. 128, 88 A.2d 310 (1952) ;
but see notes 23, 25 infra; and 4) a police officer may not without a warrant arrest
a person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed a misdemeanor, if that
misdemeanor was not committed in his presence or view, Scarlett v. State, 201 Md.
310, 93 A.2d 753, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 955 (1953); Wynkoop v. Mayor and City
Council, 159 Md. 194, 150 A. 447 (1930). See 21 Op. AT'r'Y GEN. 296 (1936).
14. See Samuel Kirk & Son v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 35 A. 1089 (1896). See alsoPrice v. State, 227 Md. 28, 175 A.2d 11 (1961). However, because a warrantless
arrest for a misdemeanor can take place only when the offense has been committed in
the officer's presence or view, acquittal of the crime charged has sometimes been held
to conclusively show an illegal arrest for the purpose of precluding the use of evidence
obtained in any accompanying search. See Parrott v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440(Ky. 1956).
15. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); Edwards v. State, 196 Md. 233, 237, 76
A.2d 132, 134 (1950).
16. Most importantly, perhaps, probable cause allows an officer to arrest for past
felonies. See Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. Rv. 125, 152-54(1941). Kauffman points out that "presence" and "view" are not synonymous. One
can view a crime from a tall building and later make a valid arrest, although legally
the crime is not committed in the arrestor's presence.
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and escape of a misdemeanant were deemed only minor dangers to
the public safety.
Probable cause may be furnished by information imparted to the
officer by someone else, 1 7 by the knowledge of the police officer him-
self,"8 or by a combination of the two.19 In Jones v. State,20 a woman
was assaulted and her pocketbook taken. She described her assailant
as a colored male, approximately five feet eight, wearing a plaid shirt.
Other witnesses at the scene described the assailant's car as a red
sports model with a black top. A radio lookout containing this in-
formation was issued, and defendant was arrested as a result of this
broadcast. The court held that the arresting officer had probable cause
to believe a felony, in this case robbery, had been committed because
he heard it on his radio, and that the officer had cause to arrest the
defendant as the perpetrator because both his general appearance and
the car he was driving matched the description in the lookout. In
Mulcahy v. State,2 a police officer was informed that a safe had been
stolen from a warehouse, that more than one person was involved,
that three of the suspects were wearing coats and jackets of specific
colors and descriptions, and that a two-tone blue and white Buick had
been seen in the vicinity of the warehouse from which the safe had
been taken. The officer knew that the defendant owned an automobile
of that description and, later that night, spotted the defendant and
three other men in the car. They were stopped and subsequently
arrested. A search of the car disclosed burglar's tools; the stolen safe
was found in another car owned by the defendant. The court concluded
that the officer's own knowledge of the defendant's past "conduct,
character and reputation" could properly be considered along with the
lookout information in determining whether probable cause existed.
It held that the officer had probable cause to believe that a felony,
grand larceny, had been committed and that defendant had committed it.
These cases indicate that probable cause may be described, basically,
as reasonable suspicion, with special emphasis on the word "reason-
able."2 The probable cause standard is intended to strike a balance
between effective protection of the public from serious crime and un-
warranted interference with the liberty of private persons.
In the case of misdemeanors, the public interest in being protected
from outlawed behavior is not so compelling as it is with felonies.
17. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959). These were cases in which police officers received "tips" from
informers they knew to be reliable. However, mere anonymous tips may not constitute
probable cause. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Contee v. United
States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
18. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; Mulcahy v. State, 221
Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80 (1960).
19. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; McRae v. State, 3 Md.
App. 388, 239 A.2d 607 (1968).
20. 242 Md. 95, 218 A.2d 7 (1966).
21. 221 Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80 (1960).
22. "Probable cause", "reasonable cause", "reasonable grounds" and "reasonable
suspicion" are variant phrasings which seek to convey substantially the same idea.
See United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937). The reasonable man
of negligence fame is sometimes employed in this area: probable cause exists if the
"facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that
the offense had been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
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Accordingly, unwarranted police interference with a private person's
liberty is necessarily more offensive and more to be guarded against.
At common law, no police officer could arrest a person committing
a misdemeanor in his presence unless he first procured a warrant or
unless that misdemeanor amounted to a breach of the peace.2" This
rule was so rigorous, in part, because in the days before organized
police forces were common, arrest was often a pretext for shanghaiing
or kidnapping. As the fear of fictitious arrest diminished and the
morally unhealthy aspects of permitting many crimes to go unchecked
became recognized, the requirement of a breach of the peace was
gradually dropped. In some states this change was effected by statute ;24
in Maryland the requirement was eliminated by judicial implication. 25
A police officer may now arrest, without a warrant, any person
committing a misdemeanor in his presence or view.
In Maryland there is a well-developed body of law surrounding
the felony-misdemeanor distinction because of the Bouse Act."6 This
Act, passed in 1929, provided that evidence illegally seized, with certain
specified exceptions,27 could not be admitted in a trial for a misdemeanor.
The reasoning behind the legislation was that while illegal activity
by the police was to be discouraged, it should not be discouraged at
the expense of exposing the public to felons freed on evidentiary
technicalities. Under the Bouse Act, it was common to appeal mis-
demeanor convictions on the ground that the appellant's arrest was
illegal and, thus, that any evidence seized was improperly admitted.
Because of the superfluity of such cases, judicial construction of the
phrase "in the presence or view" has been extensive. "Presence" or
"view" connotes not only what is seen by the officer but also what is
perceived by any of his other senses. Thus, where officers were in
the outer room of a lodge hall and heard remarks from another room
indicating the commission of an offense involving obscenity and lewd-
ness, the officers were justified in entering that room, arresting those
inside and seizing obscene films, on the ground that an offense was
being committed in their presence.2" Many of the cases decided under
this Act involved gambling offenses, either bookmaking or lottery.
23. 4 W. BLACKSTONt, COMMENTARIES *292; 10 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND
§ 632, at 342-45 (3d ed. 1955). As to this requirement, Maryland has not followed
common law. See note 13 supra and note 25 infra.
24. ARIz. REv. STAIT. § 13-1403 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 26-210 (1962)
CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West. Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (Supp. 1969);
Ky. REv. ConE ANN. § 2470 (1942); N.D. CtN. CODE § 29-06-15 (Supp. 1967).
25. Maryland seems to have assumed that no distinction exists in a police officer's
power over breach of peace and other types of misdemeanors. As a result, the courts
have not formally decided this question. See Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Cain, 81 Md. 87,
31 A. 801 (1895) (dealing with a private person's power to arrest and limiting it to
misdemeanors that amounted to a breach of the peace) ; Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490
(1876) ; Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Md. 176 (1870).
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 5 (1965).
27. When the Act was passed, illegally seized evidence was admissible in Mary-
land. The Act precluded its consideration in all misdemeanor trials, except those for
carrying a concealed weapon, violating the narcotics laws and, in some counties, gam-
bling. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), of course, superseded this Act and made the
felony-misdemeanor distinction immaterial in this context.
28. Bass v. State, 182 Md. 486, 35 A.2d 155 (1943).
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Possession of gambling or lottery equipment is itself a crime,29 but
the evidence may be easily concealed or disposed of. In Silverstein
v. State,3" a detail of policemen was sent to investigate a gambling
offense. One of the officers entered the premises and observed a
gambling operation in progress. The detail entered, and the officer
who had seen the operation described it to the sergeant in charge,
who thereupon arrested the defendant. The court held that it was
immaterial which member of the detail actually arrested the defendant
so long as his offense had actually occurred in the presence of one
of them.
The court in Robinson was faced with a situation where the
arresting officer was not aware of the commission of a crime through
any of his own senses. He had the radioed report of a crime, 3' but
he was almost a mile from the scene of the crime, at least ten minutes
traveling time. The court assumed that the defendant was arrested
for storehouse breaking, a misdemeanor, 32 and properly concluded that
the arrest would be valid without a warrant only if the crime were
committed in the presence or view of the arresting officer. The court
reviewed the authorities and found two cases involving radio reports
in which the arrests were upheld. In the first case,13 a police officer
in Baltimore City had probable cause to believe that defendant had
committed a rape, and broadcast a description of defendant and his
automobile, together with a statement that defendant was wanted for
rape and other crimes. Later the defendant was arrested by Anne
Arundel County Police. The court held:
The officers in Anne Arundel County who made the arrest knew
nothing about the probable cause but they had received a "look
out" for the defendant from a responsible source and we think
that is sufficient. If the police team working on the particular
case had accumulated sufficient information to furnish probable
cause for a reasonable man to believe that the alleged crime had
been committed and that there was probable cause to believe that
the defendant was involved therein, there was sufficient cause
for his arrest.34
In the second case, 3 the defendants were arrested after they had been
stopped as a result of a lookout. The men had been observed rifling
a hardware store. They were convicted of storehouse breaking, the
same misdemeanor involved in the Robinson case. The court found
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 240 (gambling and bookmaking), 362 (lottery)
(1967).
30. 176 Md. 533, 6 A.2d 465 (1939).
31. Under some circumstances the actual commission of a crime can be heard
through the use of an electronic device so as to make it occur within the listening
officer's presence. See People v. Burgess, 170 Cal. App. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 524 (1959)(investigators heard bribe offered over two-way radio).
32. Storehouse breaking was a misdemeanor on July 4, 1965, the time the offense
in Robinson was allegedly committed. It was made a felony by a 1966 legislative
enactment which is not applicable to crimes committed before June 1, 1966. Ch. 628,§ 33, [1966] Md. Laws 1125. This act "upgraded" many other crimes.
33. Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434 (1963).
34. Id. at 531-32.
35. Lamot v. State, 2 Md. App. 378, 234 A.2d 615 (1967).
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that the description of the crime gave the officers receiving the lookout
probable cause to believe that the felony of grand larceny had been
committed, and held that the evidence seized at the time of arrest
was admissible.
Using these two felony cases, and citing the fact situation in
Silverstein, the court in the Robinson case concluded:
We think it is a proper extension of the rationale of Silverstein
that when a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of a police
officer and information is promptly placed on the police radio
that the misdemeanor has been committed and a description of
the misdemeanant given, as was done here, the arrest of the mis-
meanant by another police officer within a reasonable time of the
receipt of the broadcast information is valid. 6
The troublesome distinction between arrests for a misdemeanor
and arrests for a felony is one the courts have been aware of for a
considerable time. In Oden v. State3" the court made reference to a
Maryland Law Review article on the subject,38 but stated that the
problems raised therein could be dealt with only by legislative action.
In that case it was held that although the defendant may have been
legally arrested, he did not have standing to invoke the protection of
the Bouse Act because he was only a passenger and not the owner
of the car in which burglar's tools were found.
In Goad v. State,3 a private watchman observed two men fleeing
from the area of a warehouse where a burglar alarm had gone off.
The only description he could give was that one of the men was
wearing a black three quarter length coat. They had fled in the
direction of a stream. This information was broadcast, and officers
cruising the area stopped defendant about half an hour later. His
clothing was wet; a search of his person disclosed items that were
identified at the trial as coming from the warehouse. At the trial one
of the arresting officers testified that defendant was arrested because
"there was a felony committed in the area." He was asked what felony,
and replied, "Breaking and Entering."4 The court held that defendant
36. 4 Md. App. at 528, 243 A.2d at 887.
37. 222 Md. 325, 329, 159 A.2d 867, 869 (1960).
38. Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. Rev. 125 (1941).
39. 239 Md. 345, 211 A.2d 337 (1965).
40. Id. at 348, 211 A.2d at 339. The defendant in Goad was convicted of a violation
of MD. ANN. CoDg art. 27, § 33 (1967), which is substantially similar to the crime
involved in Robinson, but which requires a larceny of goods as well as a breaking and
entering. See Graczyk v. State, 233 Md. 245, 196 A.2d 469 (1964). Goad illustrates
one of the difficulties with the Robinson rationale. The officers arrested Goad as the
result of a "lookout" broadcast over the police radio. They did not know that the
information contained in the broadcast was given by a private person. The selfsame
information would, under Robinson, have made the arrest valid if a policeman rather
than a private watchman had surprised the defendant in the act. While Lamot and
Farrow rightly considered radio reports a basis for probable cause, it is questionable
whether radio reports can constitute "presence." See Stanley v. State, 230 Md. 188,186 A.2d 478 (1962); 38 NoTaz DAMs LAWYMR 751 (1963). In Stanley, Maryland
officers arrested defendants as a result of a police radio broadcast. The broadcast was
issued by New York federal officers who did not witness the crime. The court held
that the arrest and subsequent search for narcotics in defendants possession, a Mary-
land misdemeanor, was illegal and reversed the conviction.
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was arrested for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence or
view of the officers and that evidence seized by the officers as a
result of this arrest was inadmissible. The conviction was reversed.
The Goad case, while it appears on its face to contradict the Robinlson
holding, is distinguishable from the Robinson factual situation. In
Goad, the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of a private
person - no police officer witnessed the crime. In Robinson, however,
a member of the police "team" actually observed the commission of
the misdemeanor.
The problems created by the felony-misdemeanor distinction, both
in Maryland and in other jurisdictions, are well known.4 1 They have
been noted time and time again, but legislative response has been
slow.42 A meaningful step was taken, however, when the General
Assembly passed, in its latest session, a bill which will permit a police
officer to arrest without a warrant persons that he has probable cause
to believe have committed certain serious misdemeanors.4 3 Such an
arrest may be made under the new bill only where the officer has
reason to believe that the suspect, unless he is immediately arrested,
may not be apprehended, may cause further injury to property or
person or may tamper with or dispose of evidence. While this bill
does remedy some of the evils which attend the felony-misdemeanor
distinction in Maryland, the peculiar solution offered by the bill only
complicates the already confused legal framework of the law of arrest.
A police officer, under the new law, must decide not only whether the
crime committed is a felony or misdemeanor but must also, if he
concludes that a misdemeanor has occurred, determine whether or
not the misdemeanor fits into one of the eight rather comprehensive
classes of misdemeanors for which a warrantless arrest, based on
probable cause, is permitted. If he decides that the crime is covered
by the new bill and that he has probable cause to arrest the suspect, he
must then make the extremely close policy determination concerning
the probability of the suspect's future apprehension, the danger of
future injury and the possibility of the destruction of evidence. A
mistake in any of these decisions by an officer who must make the
decisions often in a matter of seconds may cost the state a conviction.
41. See Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. REv. 125 (1941);
Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MIcH. L. Rtv. 673 (1924) ; Note, Notice of
Cause of Arrest, 25 MD. L. REv. 48, 55-56 (1965) ; Note, Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure, 2 MD. L. REv. 147 (1938) ; Note, Error
in Charging a Misdemeanor as a Felony, 2 MD. L. REv. 284 (1938) ; 25 S. CAL. L.
Rxv. 449 (1952) ; 13 SYR. L. REv. 320 (1961) ; 21 WASH. & L44 L. REv. 249 (1964).
42. The General Assembly has moved to correct some of the most glaring incon-
sistencies. For example, before 1949, assault with intent to rape, although carrying a
possible death sentence, was a misdemeanor; the crime was given felony status in
ch. 196, [1949] Md. Laws 546, now codified as MD. ANN. CODe art. 27, § 12 (1967).
The recent upgrading of numerous crimes to felonies, see note 32 supra, is a step in
the direction of rational classification, but with the confusing structure of the present
Article 27 of the Maryland Annotated Code, the Article on Crimes, it is still piece-
meal work.
43. MD. H.B. 3, 1969 Sess. The explanation for the bill states, "Subsection (d)
and (e) undertakes to expand the power of police officers to arrest without a warrant
for some offenses which are classified as misdemeanors, but constitute serious offenses
in that they involve intent to do great bodily harm." 1 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF
MARYLAND, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1969 8.
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The new bill, while it is motivated by a legitimate desire to increase
the arresting officer's power over persons who commit certain of the
more serious misdemeanors, only serves to further muddle the already
obscure felony-misdemeanor distinction.
It appears, then, that the task of achieving some equitable and
practical treatment of the problem has, by default, passed to the
judicial arm. In Price v. State,44 the Court of Appeals held that an
arrest on probable cause for an attempted burglary, although tech-
nically a misdemeanor, would still constitute a good arrest. Robinson
v. State appears to be another example of judicial revision. 45 In an
age where the problems of crime control and prevention are becoming
ever more complex, it seems clear that arrest law created for the uses
of Elizabethan England is an unnecessary burden. When a police
officer sees a person who, because of a "lookout," he reasonably
suspects of having committed a crime, he should not have to ascertain
at his peri 46 if the crime committed is a felony or a misdemeanor.
A case can be made for distinguishing between types of crimes for the
purpose of determining how much interference with personal liberty
should be permitted. However, while it may not be in the best public
interest to apply uniform arrest treatment to all crimes, that interest
clearly will not be served by blindly following a judicially created
doctrine which has been extended beyond the limits of its legitimate
purpose.4 7 Where a state has, like Maryland, little rational justification
behind its classification of crimes, it makes little sense to adhere to
rules which presuppose such a rational classification. The Robinson
decision will make law enforcement work easier, but, because it per-
petuates the arbitrary felony-misdemeanor distinction, it may be a
disservice in the long run.
48
44. 227 Md. 28, 175 A.2d 11 (1961).
45. The court in Robinson, however, claimed that its decision did not change
existing law. 4 Md. App. at 528, 243 A.2d at 888.
46. Where the arrest is unlawful, the arresting officer faces a possible civil suitfor false arrest, and the suspect is entitled to physically resist. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 403 (1865) ; Craft v. State, 202 Miss. 43, 30
So. 2d 414 (1947). An interview with the Education and Training Division of the
Baltimore City Police Department reveals that in a police trainee's course of fourteen
weeks, some fifteen classroom hours are devoted to the law of arrest. The policemen
are expected to know the distinction between felony and misdemeanor and to be able
to apply it. The Robinson decision is now being taught there.
47. For a discussion of judicial strictness and liberality in interpreting the
"presence" doctrine, see 37 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 367 (1963) ; Agnello v. United States,
290 F. 671, 678-79 (2d Cir. 1923).
48. Another danger lies in the fact that there are many misdemeanors that are
truly trivial. MD. ANN. COD art. 27, §§ 70-70B (1967) makes it a misdemeanor in
certain Maryland counties to allow female dogs "in heat" to run at large. Police
arrest on "constructive presence" for these offenses would be intolerable. Also, no
time or space limitations other than mere "reasonableness" are imposed in Robinson. In
Farrow, the defendant was arrested in another county. These considerations make it
desirable that Robinson be rather strictly limited to its facts.
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